Abstract-Cyber-physical systems are now becoming increasingly prevalent and possibly even mainstream. Infrastructures have been around as long as urban centers, supporting a society's needs for its planning, operation, and safety. As we move deeper into the 21st century, these infrastructures are becoming smart -they monitor themselves through sensornetworks, communicate through a layered architecture, and most importantly self-govern through multiple agents, resulting in a complex integration and interaction between cyber and physical components.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are physical systems whose operations are monitored, coordinated, self-governed and integrated by a system of sophisticated computing and communication algorithms. Over the past five years, major advances have taken place in the area of cyber-physical systems, from nano-scales to large scales at the system of systems levels. Examples of CPS range from medical devices and nano-robotics to next generation air transportation, intelligent highway systems, smart buildings, smart grids, and smart cities.
Advances in CPS have been reported at multiple fronts. Fundamental building blocks that combine the discrete, logic based, principles of computation and uncertainties and continuous dynamics of physical systems have been developed. Principles of codesign of control and implementation platform that ensures high control performance with minimal computational and communication resources have been developed. Several tools are being assembled for ensuring both cybersecurity and physical reliability in the face of natural and cyber attacks. Tools for evaluating privacy concerns are being synthesized. Benefits are being continuously reported in several application domains that range from energy and healthcare to aviation, ground transportation, and robotics.
With theoretical advances taking place in control systems, real-time systems, and embedded systems, it can be argued that at systems level, we have obtained a good understanding of basic properties of stability, robustness, and reliability as well as a good grasp of fundamental properties of hybrid and switched and event-triggered systems that serve as central building blocks for the analysis and synthesis of CPS. With the above understanding of the basics of CPS at a systems level, we believe that the time is right to go to the next step, Infrastructure-CPS, and forms the focus of the proposed tutorial.
Infrastructures are the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g., buildings, roads, and power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or enterprise. Infrastructures have been around as long as urban centers, supporting a society's needs for its planning, operation, and safety. As we move deeper into the 21st century, these infrastructures are becoming smart -monitor themselves, communicate, and most importantly self-govern, which we denote as Infrastructure-CPS. What distinguishes an Infrastructure-CPS from a CPS, for the purposes of discussion in this tutorial is that in the former, the goals are that of an infrastructure, that is, to provide a service that's infrastructure wide, of value to the end-user. Examples are the delivery of reliable and affordable power, water at a high quality, or transportation at an affordable cost. What distinguishes an infrastructure-CPS from an infrastructure, for the purposes of discussion in this paper, is that the former is smart, i.e. includes sensors of various kinds that provide information about the infrastructure, as well as decision-makers that effect a change in the infrastructure. This tutorial will focus on three main pillars of Infrastructure-CPS: (i) End-user Empowerment, (ii) Transactive Control, and (iii) Resilience. This will be followed by two examples, one on the nexus between power and communication infrastructure, and the other between natural gas and electricity, both of which have been investigated extensively of late, and are emerging to be apt illustrations of Infrastructure-CPS.
The first building block concerns the consumer, which can be argued as the main feature of an Infrastructure-CPS. That is, the goal of the underlying cyberphysical system is to provide a service that's of value to the end-user, who is the consumer of the infrastructure. In contrast to the traditional role of the consumer, which is typically a passive 2016 American Control Conference (ACC) Boston Marriott Copley Place July [6] [7] [8] 2016 . Boston, MA, USA one, in a smart infrastructure is more central, and notably an active one. Given that the underlying problem in a smart infrastructure is one of managing resources and making them available at the right location and at the right time, there is a distinct paradigm shift taking place in this topicthe end-user is empowered with making decisions, based on frequent, real-time, and distributed information available about the overall infrastructure. The questions that arise related to such a decision making as well as the collection of pertinent information and its processing, the underlying tools, methodologies, and challenges are all problems that fall within the broad rubric of systems and control.
If one can view the first pillar of empowered consumers as an actuator, the second pillar of a smart infrastructure, Transactive Control, can be viewed as a control input to this actuator. Given that in a smart infrastructure, the consumer plays an active role and can carry out decisions that impact the infrastructure dynamics, the question that arises is about the actual signal that the consumer responds to. Defined broadly as a mechanism through which systemand component-level decisions are made through economic contracts negotiated between the components of the system, in conjunction with or in lieu of traditional controls [1] , transactive control is being explored in depth in the context of a smart grid infrastructure. Some of the basic features and tools that have been examined under this heading are discussed in this paper.
The third pillar is resilience of the infrastructure. A distinguishing feature of any infrastructure is not only its ability to deliver a service, but to deliver it in a reliable and resilient manner. The former can be argued as a robustness property under nominal disturbances. Resilience refers the capacity of an infrastructure to withstand severe disturbances -both random failures and targeted adversarial attacksand still continues to operate. In the presence of empowered users, who can directly impact the control actions within the system, it is critical to engineer resilience into the infrastructure. However, the tight coupling of the continuous and the discrete dynamics in infrastructure-CPS make the design and analysis of resilience particularly challenging. An obvious challenge arises from the scale of the infrastructure; while each individual system may have a small state space, the coupling between these systems leads to a very large number of interacting states. Additionally, the faults and attacks in one part of the infrastructure can propagate to adversely affect other systems. A more subtle challenge is balancing the diverse requirements and constraints of the composite system. The optimal control strategy for one system may not align with the global requirements leading to compromises. The tutorial session will present some of the tools and methods used to examine the resilience within this context. Two examples will be presented that illustrate the main the role of these pillars. The first is the Electricity infrastructure-CPS which includes natural gas fired power plants. Already a large portion of the electricity portfolio mix in many regions in the US, NG-fired power generation is increasing even further with growing penetration of renewable energy due to the formers fast, on-demand response capabilities, and latters characteristics of intermittency and uncertainty. As a result, NG and electricity networks are getting increasingly linked and interdependent. Recent results from modeling of this interconnection and interdependency will be presented in this paper, and highlight the role of transactive control in the synthesis of the underlying Infrastructure-CPS. The second example deals with the integration of power transmission systems with communication networks motivated by resilience concerns. We will describe a potential way of constructing a distributed multi-loop networked system for wide-area control of large power grids that consists of a set of distributed optimal control algorithms for providing resiliency against small-signal oscillations, that will be implemented on top of a distributed computing infrastructure connected by high-speed wide-area networks, consisting of both Software Defined Networking (SDN)-enabled Internet, and the traditional layer-2 or layer 3 Internet.
II. FOUNDATION 1: EMPOWERED CONSUMERS
The traditional role played by consumers in infrastructures is a passive one. Whether it's electricity consumption in power grids, water consumption, or transportation resources such as parking and highway occupancy, the fundamental assumption has been that demand always remains inelastic. In power grids, for instance, customers consumed as much power as they wanted, whenever they wanted it, and accepted a feedback mechanism in terms of an electricity bill with a time delay that's typically a month's duration. The infrastructure is then designed by adjusting resources and associated components so that supply of resources exceeds demand. Of late, this notion is being challenged, with Demand Response, a concept being increasingly investigated in the context of Smart Grid.
Demand response denotes the concept of adjustable demand in response to grid conditions and incentives and has a history dating back at least to the late Fred Schweppe's pioneering work on homeostatic grid control in the 1970s [2] . By allowing consumption to be generated alongside of generation, the premise is that one can manage uncertain and variable renewable generation in a much more efficient manner (see Figure 1 ).That is, by using a judicious control algorithm that simultaneously adjusts the demand as well as generation, the goal is to deliver reliable and affordable power. This concept is now beginning to be explored in other infrastructures such as highway transportation, parking in urban centers, water networks, and natural gas networks.
The biggest challenge that the empowerment of consumers introduces is the fact that there are multiple decision makers. In addition to the fact that there are several "actuators", capable of introducing independent control inputs, the additional complexity is that these end-users are of different kinds. In the context of a smart building, in addition to the occupants, users include management, maintenance staff, and grid-side operators, to name a few. In the context of power grids, in addition to individual consumer, there are Fig. 1 . The role of an empowered consumer is to adjust their consumption in response to an incentive that may be financial, sustainability based, or through a social network [3] (Courtesy of T. Samad, Honeywell). microgrid operators, utilities, regulation agencies, and several other balancing authorities [4] . The question then is how global performance specifications (such as frequency control and power balance in a power grid) related to reliability and affordability that are central to infrastructure needs can be achieved with multitudinous agents exercising their options and decisions at multiple time-scales.
While this is a highly active area of research, with various approaches being employed by research groups around the world, we briefly mention three topics that are being investigated in detail: 1) Dynamic modeling of end users: Given that consumers can allow demand to be a flexible entity, the next step is to model the value function that the consumers are most responsive to. In the context of smart grids, for example, the underlying model may have a structure as in Figure 2 , where the first block returns a risk aversion function that may be dependent on economics, environment, comfort, or other factors. This decision then becomes an input into a physical system, such as HVAC, Refrigerators, or other devices. Such models have begun to be employed both in the context of smart grids [5] and smart cities [6] . 2) Global optimization using local and distributed control: This is a broad topic that is being addressed by a number of researchers in the control community, both from a theoretical perspective (see for example, [7] , [8] ) and from an application perspective, (see for example, [9] , [10] ). The challenge here is to ensure local performance metrics such as stability robustness at faster time scales, and optimization at slower time scales. Any control solutions that are proposed must accommodate realistic constraints that are imposed by the end user dynamics and decision making, as well as the constraints imposed by on the associated communication infrastructure. 3) Risk-limiting approaches: The main idea behind the empowered users is that they are endowed with a flexibility in availing themselves of resources that an infrastructure provides. By providing suitable incentives to the consumers, the goal is to ensure an optimal utilization of these resources. For example, as there is more surplus of inexpensive energy due to growth in renewables, electricity prices decrease, and if consumers are flexible in their consumption with less consumption when prices are high and more when prices are low, then this flexibility can be utilized to accommodate variability from renewables. However, all end users, whether individual consumers, or larger organizational entities, are risk averse. Models as outlined in Figure 2 are often inadequate when it comes to decision making that also manages risks that may be incurred over a larger time-scale. Recent results such as [11] , [12] attempt to address this problem using a multi-stage stochastic formulation by making decisions of dynamic contracts for consumption valid for a block of time, with the blocks and decisions updated as operations approach real-time. In the tutorial session, some of the fundamentals of these three topics will be presented.
III. FOUNDATION 2: TRANSACTIVE CONTROL
A concept that is eliciting significant attention of late is Transactive Control [1] , [13] , [15] , a feedback control strategy enabled through economic contracts. A typical transactive controller consists of an incentive signal sent to the consumer from the infrastructure and a feedback signal received from the consumer, and together the goal is to ensure that the underlying resources are optimally utilized.
As is clear from the above description, the underlying problem is the control of a socio-economic-technical system and as such, the underlying tools for its analysis and design are to be assembled not only from systems and control, but also from microeconomics such as mechanism design, theory of incentives, game theory, and contract theory and from behavioral models of individuals, consumers, and organizations. In addition to assembling the underlying theoretical results and understanding the fundamental challenges in the analysis and design of market-based control, one also needs to identify potential barriers for the adoption of these control strategies and consumers gaming the system, as their implementation will have to be approved by entities related to policy and regulation, and accommodate strategic and non-rational consumer behavior. In what follows, a snapshot of market-based approaches that have been adopted in the area of Smart Grid will be presented, summarized concisely in [14] . Market-based approaches for achieving socio-economictechnical system objectives evolve around two groups of market players. In the first group are the load aggregators whose primary responsibility is to represent individual users at the wholesale electricity market. While representing end users, it is at times in their interest to induce desired demand behavior of the aggregated groups of loads, which is an effort realized by using incentive signals through transactive control architecture. To accomplish this, load aggregators can design retail market rules using mechanism design and contract theory, while observing given wholesale market structure and public utility commission issued regulations regarding retail electricity markets.
In the second group are the individual users, who are buying electricity from the load aggregators via retail contracts. Understanding of electricity usage and load capabilities empowers the end users to make the adequate decisions under given retail market structure and respond to the incentives in the most efficient manner.
To design an adequate transactive architecture it is necessary to represent behavior of end users and the load aggregators in a truthful way. Looking at the problem from the perspective of a load aggregator, an end user i could be described with one or more of the following attributes: i) the physical constraints of its loads in terms of consumed power P i ∈ P i , ii) the consumed power valuation function v i (P i , θ i ) where θ i ∈ T is a random variable representing a particular realization of a consumer type, iii) and by the consumer's utility function u i (P i , λ i , θ i ) where λ i ∈ R denotes the price of electricity for consumer i.
The coordinator is usually in charged of maximizing social welfare of the market participants, i.e. it is solving the following optimization problem max P1,...,Pn i
where c ( i P i ) is the cost of purchasing and supplying the entire load under the load aggregator and g(P 1 , ..., P n ) ≤ 0 are the transportation constraints. Problem (1) can be easily restated as a dynamic programming problem if the load aggregator needs a solution over a certain time horizon. Fundamental nature of the problem (1) depends on the information available to the load aggregator who could have either complete or incomplete information, and on the rationality assumption for the user who could behave either strategically or non-strategically.
If complete information is available to the load aggregator and the end users are non-strategic then the problem (1) is regarded as the centralized optimization or optimal control problem. In this scenario, load aggregator determines the consumed power P i for all users. Such approach is suitable, for example, university campus operation.
If the load aggregator possesses the complete information about the user constraints and their valuation function but cannot directly control the consumed power since the users are strategic, then the problem (1) is regarded as a Stackelberg game that can be solved using bi-level optimization. In this approach, the load aggregator first determines the price λ i and the user optimizes its own utility accordingly. Some references in this area include [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] .
If the end users are non-strategic but the load aggregator does not possess the complete information, then the problem (1) becomes a decentralized optimization problem. The solution methods in this area often use iterative information exchange [20] , [21] , [22] .
Finally, mechanism design is used if load aggregator does not have complete information and the end users are behaving strategically. The goal of mechanism design is to determine such market rules under which the game theoretic equilibrium matches the one of the social welfare. Discriminatory pricing [23] , [24] , [25] and uniform-pricing mechanisms are typical representatives of mechanism design.
With these various market based approaches, while many of the building blocks for transactive control are in place, several challenges remain, especially in the realm of scalability, reliability and risk-sharing. Scalability has to be obtained while observing the physical limitations of the communication and computation hardware, and time-constants of physical processes underlying the infrastructure. This requires tighter integration of the described market approaches with the technical capabilities of the infrastructure. Second, integrity of infrastructure operation often requires guarantees from the controller in terms of technical performance. Since market-based approaches are a type of indirect control, often even having human in the loop, guarantees on technical performance are harder to obtain. Third, risk-sharing between participating entities is crucial for bringing transactive control to practice, and thus, the tractability of the implemented control method plays a crucial role. Further developments in scalability, reliability and risk-sharing are required to successfully transition existing market approaches to practice.
IV. FOUNDATION 3: RESILIENCE
The survivability of critical infrastructures in the presence of security attacks and random faults is of national importance. These infrastructures are spatially distributed across large physical areas and consist of heterogeneous cyber-physical components interconnected with complex peering and hierarchical networks. Networked Control Systems (NCS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used to monitor, control, and remotely manage infrastructures over private or shared communication networks. The cyber-physical systems (CPS) permit synergistic interactions between physical dynamics and computational processes. Wide deployment of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) results in higher reliability and lower operational costs relative to the traditional proprietary and closed systems. However, as several recent incidents indicate, the CPS today are facing new security threats driven by their exposure to ICT insecurities and these are bound to increase with the scale and complexity of infrastructure-CPS.
Resilience in an infrastructure refers to the ability to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of various faults and attacks that challenge normal operation. For example, a denial of service attack may have some impact on a system and hence some immediate impact on the services it offers to the end users. The system will then adapt and recover and the service levels improve and, depending on the severity of the attack, at some later time full service may be restored even when the attack has not completely subsided.
A distributed cyber physical infrastructure has a layered architecture consisting of regulatory control (layer 1), supervisory control (layer 2), and a management level (layer 3). This architecture enables robust composition of multilevel controllers, and permits operators to use strategies to limit the effects of faults and attacks. The regulatory control layer directly interacts with the underlying physical infrastructure dynamics through a network of sensors and actuators. These physical field devices are connected to programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or remote terminal units (RTUs), and implement detection and regulation mechanisms that are primarily reactive in nature and use local information. The regulatory controllers (or PLCs) interact with the supervisory controllers via a control network.
At the supervisory control layer, model-based diagnostic tools are combined with optimal control-based tools to ensure on-time response to distributed failures and threats. The supervisory workstations are used for data logging, diagnostic functions such as fault diagnosis, and supervisory control computations such as set-point control and controller reconfigurations. The physical infrastructure control inputs u are processed to produce several measurements y that represent the response of the physical infrastructure. The control design task in the presence of attacks, is to choose the input u so that the output response y(t) satisfies the performance and stability requirements. Because the physical process is large and complex, it may consist of several energy cells with load and generation entities distributed over a large geographical area, the appropriate choice of u is in not straightforward.
Resilience in infrastructure-CPS is an area of active research, with various approaches being employed by research groups to model and analyze how their control algorithms and systems fair in the presence of attacks and failures. The tutorial will focus on the tools that are associated with USC/ISI's DETERLab cyber security and networked systems research testbed to provide the core network and attack modeling, emulation, and execution facilities to implement the scenarios. This tutorial will focus on the following areas: 1) Threat modeling The three fundamental properties of information, namely, confidentiality, integrity, and availability can be attacked in infrastructure-CPS. Confidentiality refer to the concealment of data, ensuring it remains known only to the authorized parties. Disclosure attacks enable the adversary to gather sequences of data I k from the calculated control actions u k and the real measurements y k . The physical dynamics of the system are not affected by this type of attack. Integrity relates to the trustworthiness of data, meaning there is no unauthorized change to the information between the source and destination. Deception attacks modify the control actions u k and sensor measurements y k which can be modeled as perturbations ∆u k and ∆y k , respectively, in the respective data channels. Availability considers the timely access to information or system functionalities. Disruption attacks prevent the transmitted data from reaching the desired destination. Such attacks can impact the system by blocking the data or feedback signals, using denial of service attacks, replay attacks, or zero dynamics attacks [27] . Figure 5 illustrates the afore-mentioned three categories of attacks and how they violate the security properties. In all three cases, the physical plant is sending a measurement vector y k = [7, 14] τ to the controller through the communication network. This was intended to be a private message to be known only to the plant and the controller. Leveraging the tools and methods on the DETER testbed, we will discuss how to model and experiment with all three types of attacks [26] in the tutorial session.
2) Experimentation frameworks
As demand response models [28] grow in participation, Internet-like dynamics will influence algorithm operation. Models of dynamic markets that do not consider such network issues may prove unreliable or inconsistent when implemented in realistic communication environments. The influence of the dynamics of communication networks on markets and their convergence, when driven by faults and failures, should to be analyzed in detail before they can adopted widely on the smart grid.
In the tutorial session, we will present a framework to evaluate the resilience of dynamic market and control mechanisms in the presence of network dynamics by separating its communication components, the independent system operator (ISO), generators, and loads, across the network. The framework will be evaluated using USC/ISI's DETER testbed. We will present a set of resilience scenarios and execute them to evaluate the performance of markets and controls under the stress of faults and failures [29] .
3) Distributed optimization with attacks
The current state-of-the-art centralized communication and information processing architecture of WAMS will no longer be sustainable under the various threats discussed above. Modeling and evaluating the infrastructure in the presence of attacks is essential [30] .
Motivated by this challenge, in this tutorial we will present recent results of implementing wide-area monitoring algorithms over a distributed communication infrastructure using massive volumes of real-time PMU data. Our goal will be to provide an example of how distributing a monitoring functionality over multiple estimators can guarantee significantly more resiliency against large scale cyber attacks [31] . The tutorial employs USC/ISIs DETERLab cybersecurity and networked systems testbed, a high-fidelity emulation of a large-scale distributed communication network. DETERLab has been funded by NSF, DHS, and DARPA since 2003 and provides several methods and tools that allow researchers to conduct large scale and complex cyber security and resilience experiments on networked control systems [32] . The DETERLab has hundreds of real hardware nodes, high-end PCs, that are linked via high speed Ethernet lines that are switched to create the desired topologies. The testbed provides a web-based GUI to remotely access the users experiment and thr supporting experiment management tools. DETERLab has several innovative experimental capabilities such multi-resolution virtualization of experiment resources, modeling of human behavior, federation to connect heterogeneous resources, multiparty experiments for collaboration and competitions, experiment orchestration and management to control real-time interaction with the Internet. The DETER federation system enables an experiment to remotely connect to heterogeneous resources, such as a SCADA system or a RTDS-like simulator, located at other testbeds. The DETERLab has used federation as part of collaborations with the DOE Pacific National Labs (PNNL), the University of Illinois, Iowa State University, and North Carolina State University to study security and resiliency in infrastructure-CPS.
V. EXAMPLE 1: THE ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE INCLUDING NATURAL GAS POWER PLANTS
One of the most prominent sectors of the 21st century that has far reaching effects on all citizens of this world is energy. A critical infrastructure that serve as a substrate of the energy sector is the power grid. Due to a variety of factors including the shale gas revolution, an aging coal fleet, and the need for increasingly flexible power generation plants to facilitate the addition of renewable power generation, the reliance of the electricity sector on NG has risen dramatically. As storage of large quantities of the fuel is limited to specific geological formations or costly, Gas-Fired Generator (GFG) plants use gas as it is delivered to them. This leads to one just-in-time resource (natural gas) being used by another just-in-time resource (electricity). The dependence between these two sectors has led to concerns over scheduling, transportation, and communication.
The electricity infrastructure consists of generators from which power is transferred via long distance, high-voltage transmission lines, with the voltage gradually stepped down through distribution systems to the end-user. With demand largely treated as an uncontrolled, exogenous input, electric utilities have an assumed "obligation to serve" in which generation needs to be operated to meet this exogenous load demand at all times [33] . This balance between supply and demand is typically carried out by independent system operators. The NG network is quite similar to the electricity network, in terms of the network topology -it consists of transmission (pipelines), producers (wells), storage, and consumers. Pipelines use compressors along the line to create the flow of NG from the injection point on the line to the consumer of the NG. NG marketers, facilitate movement of NG by coordinating the sale of gas quantity and pipeline capacity contracts.
There are significant operational, contracting, planning, and regulatory differences between the two infrastructures as well [34] . The underlying physics, that of the path of an electron from generation to the consumer versus the path of fuel from production wells to the end user, are different, with the former moving at the speed of light, and the latter significantly below the speed of sound. Storage is highly expensive, and therefore scant in the former, while simple and necessary in NG. Economies of scale are much larger in electric power transmission projects, as opposed to NG transmission. Retrofitting a line to increase transmission capacity is prohibitively expensive. It is more economical to install the required capacity of a transmission line initially than to retrofit the line later. Increased capacity can be obtained with relative ease in the latter case by raising the pressure at NG pipelines. Control of individual constituents is near to impossible in the electric sector (ex. power flows in transmission segments), in relation to the NG sector (ex. NG flows in pipelines).
There are many factors that affect the reliance of the electricity sector on Natural Gas. The most common instance in places such as Northeastern US, is during cold snaps, when the demand for electricity and NG increase simultaneously for heating requirements. NG price hikes due to pipeline constraints increase marginal costs of GFGs, which in turn leads to dramatic increases in market prices for electricity. This interdependence is increased further with more emphasis on GFGs in general as coal plants retire due to environmental regulations. And most importantly, with increasing emphasis on renewables, the inevitable features of intermittency and uncertainty in renewables is necessitating a tight coordination of the electricity sector with GFGs which are capable of fast, clean, and on-demand response for power balance.
Yet another example of the need for coordination occurs in the context of markets. In deregulated electricity markets, the supply of electricity is organized through a day-ahead and real-time market, which requires accurate information on generator availability and prices as well as consumer demand. With increased reliance on NG, information on fuel availability to GFGs is of increasing concern. This is complicated by the structure of the NG sector, which has separate markets for buying NG quantities and buying NG transportation, and lacks flexible market mechanisms for a proper allocation of both products of gas quantity and capacity available for transportation. Market contracts pertaining to the gas industry can be classified as firm or interruptible. Firm contracts are long term and are paid on a monthly basis and are typically used by Local Distribution Companies (LDC). Moreover, these contracts incur an additional reservation price which pays off investment in pipeline infrastructure. Interruptible contracts are flexible and typically used by GFGs [35] . Independent System Operators in the electricity infrastructure need to know the availability of their generation plants in order to dispatch them in a manner that both assures system reliability and minimizes the total system cost. It is difficult for these system operators to rely on GFGs which could potentially have their fuel curtailed.
In what follows, we provide two case studies of the electricity infrastructure that underscore the effect of its reliance on natural gas. The role of transactive control in both cases is highlighted. Details of these results may be found in [36] and [37] .
A. Case Study 1:
Given increased renewable penetration into the electricity grid and retirement of coal and nuclear plants in New England, gas as a back-up fuel is more heavily relied upon. However, within the interdependent NG-E infrastructure, uncertainty in gas supply results from uncertainty in renewable generation as well as uncertainties associated with obtaining the gas commodity from gas marketers. Case study 1 addresses the effect of the latter. In particular, we evaluate the impact of unequal access to gas, given that the GFG plants are on non-firm contracts with unequal access to the gas markets.
We model this gas-electric interdependency as a twostage game where the first stage involves the interactions solely within the gas network and electricity network while the second stage involves the interaction between the gas and electricity networks via the GFGs interactions with gas marketers (see Figure 6 ). Within the gas network, the first stage comprises transactions between the marketers/LDCs and the pipeline operators, where the marketers/LDCs can purchase capacity on primary firm or interruptible contracts. They generally are price-takers from pipeline operators on primary markets. In addition, the marketers will consider consumer demand when obtaining/negotiating capacity on the secondary release market. The first stage game on the electricity side is the bid offer between the GFG plant and the ISO. The contract negotiated between marketers and GFGs for price, quantity, and type of service (firm or interruptible) is the second stage subgame of interest. This subgame is modelled as an optimal auction. Every variable in the firststage natural gas and electricity games is assumed to be a parameter in the second stage subgame. There is one gasmarketer and 2 GFGs assumed in the model. The two-stage game is depicted in Figure 6 . We use real data as inputs and parameters in this two-stage game model. Input data from the state of Massachusetts was obtained from the EIA and ISO-NE such as monthly demand data (and disaggregated into daily demand data), gas capacity data, gas commodity import and export data, and fuel generation data for different resource types. Assumptions on the amount of capacity available on the secondary market were made proportional to primary market demand. Figure 7 results from the second-stage game of the twostage game, and shows what the gas dispatch is given unequal access to the secondary market (that is, GFGs on interruptible contracts). We calculated the allocations of gas over a 7-year period. The ratio of gas dispatched to gas demanded is shows for each of the two GFGs for a 1-year period (year 2015). In the figure, the ratio ranges from 0 to 1. A ratio of 1 means that for that GFG, the plant received gas to meet its entire demand on that day. A ratio of 0 means that no gas was allocated to the GFG plant (demand would have been more than what could be allocated). Any ratio in between means partial gas allocation. For ratios below 1, there is not enough gas capacity to meet demand, and during this time, GFGs may not even bid into the gas market for gas. During the winter months, capacity is constrained that even if GFGs demanded a certain level of gas, they would not be able to obtain any due to their contract type and general physical constraints on the gas system. Fig. 7 . Allocations to each of the two gas-fired generators over a 1-year period. The allocations are based on gas-fired generators bids which depend upon the decision to purchase or not purchase gas. In winter months, gasfired generators more often than not choose to not purchase gas.
With increased renewable generation, the intermittency due to wind and solar generation requires GFGs to be the flexible backup generation making up for greater loads as seen in Figure 8 . As there is greater wind and solar generation, there could be more intermittency in real-time markets, potentially requiring greater gas demand in realtime which may or may not be obtained in the intraday markets. This uncertainty in need for real-time gas impacts decisions on whether or not to purchase gas as a generation fuel.
B. Case Study 2:
With the growing interdependency of NG and electricity, the inefficiencies caused by the misalignment of the markets has also grown. For example, the commodity market is most liquid between 8 am and 9 am [38] . If the timing of the markets is such that GFGs need to buy fuel outside of these times, which is currently the case, it can be difficult and costly because there are fewer market participants. The greater the market misalignment, the greater the uncertainty GFGs face in NG quantity and price. In some energy markets, GFGs do not receive their dispatch schedule from the power system operators until after the pipeline capacity Fig. 8 . This figure shows how electricity generation will change with increased penetration of renewable energy. The plot on the left shows the current generation mix, and that on the right shows one possible scenario where renewables make up for 20% of the total asset. In order to meet the desired load profile, it is therefore clear that the availability of just-in-time natural gas is essential, and becomes more pressing as renewable penetration increases. However, uncertainty in gas supply to begin with and uncertainty in electricity demand and other sources of generation can cause a decline in social welfare and volatility in gas and electric prices. market has already closed. Also, GFGs need to coordinate their dispatch and fuel delivery over two NG days (specifically, the NG intra-day market of the previous day, and the NG intra-day market of the current day) in order to meet their day ahead electricity obligations due to the timing of the markets and NG flow start times.
When GFGs fail to nominate transportation for the right amount of NG to meet their final schedule from the ISO, they often over or undertake NG from the pipeline [39] . Overtaking is taking more than the scheduled quantity and undertaking is leaving NG in the system that was previously scheduled to be removed. Pipeline operators will resell this excess NG and charge the consumer extra based on how much they over or undertake [40] . Since pipelines generally schedule transmission assuming the NG is taken throughout the day in regular increments, when generators overtake NG unexpectedly, this creates balancing problems for the pipeline system operators [38] .
In order to illustrate the effect of market misalignment, we consider a simple 4-bus network, which consists of three generators; two dispatchable (base unit and peaking unit) and one non-dispatchable, and two consumers who demand power from the system (see Figure 9 ). The conventional dispatchable generators have no fuel uncertainty and are denoted G1 and G2 and the non-dispatchable generation unit is denoted as G3 and is a GFG with fuel uncertainty. Fig. 9 . IEEE-4bus network with G1 and G2 being conventional generators and G3 being a GFG with fuel uncertainty from interruptible contracts and market misalignment.
The problem that we address with this system is the optimization of Social Welfare S W defined as
where
subject to the following consumption, generation, and network constraints
The coefficients b Daj , b Dsj , c Daj and c Dsj are consumer utility coefficients. The utility of the total consumption U Dj (P Dj ) = U Daj (P 0Daj ) + U Dsj (P Dsj ). The incremental and base price coefficients determine the behavior of the adjustable portion of the demand. The consumption values are constrained; P 0Daj and P Dsj must evolve so that in equilibrium, P 0Daj reaches a value no smaller than the derived value P [41] , with the base cost prices for the three types of generators modeled changed to reflect current energy prices from the EIA's Electricity Power Annual report [42] . The base cost is calculated by taking into account the penalties pipelines imposes on generators for taking fuel off of the Algonquin NG pipeline which services the New England area [40] . The values for the consumer utility coefficients are as listed in Table II . In order to limit the amount of adjustable demand so that the effects of NG uncertainty can be studied better, the values in bold for U Daj have been modified from what was used in [41] . The incremental cost coefficient c Daj is set at a larger negative value than the shiftable demand so that consumers have lower willingness to adjust consumption and have a higher base utility of using electricity, much like a data center which would not change their consumption of electricity even if prices rise to very high levels. A dynamic market mechanism based approach, developed recently [15] , [44] , [43] was used to determine the optimal generation and consumption profiles.
The results are summarized in Figures 10 and 11 , which show that increases in fuel uncertainty decreases Social Welfare in a non-linear manner, with a drastic change in slope at higher levels of uncertainty as seen in Figure 4 . This also implies that aligning markets and improving coordination can raise Social Welfare. Increasing the level of demand response through the shiftable Demand Response method outlined as in [41] dramatically increases the Social Welfare of the system, particularly for low levels of NG uncertainty (see Figure 5) . These results show that to a certain extent, problems with NG uncertainty do not necessarily need to be solved by changing the NG market structure, but can instead be solved through a suitably defined transactive control method implemented in the electricity market, as in [41] . The addition of just 5 percent shiftable Demand Response dramatically increases Social Welfare, regardless of natural gas uncertainty levels.
VI. EXAMPLE 2: INTEGRATING POWER SYSTEMS AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS THROUGH CONTROL CO-DESIGNS
This section illustrates the third pillar of Infrastructure-CPS, namely resilience. As outlined in the introduction, communication and computation enriched infrastructure constitutes an infrastructure-CPS. Since its goal is to provide uninterrupted service to the consumers, the infrastructure-CPS must be resilient to failures in the physical and cyber domains. In what follows, we return to the power grid, but focus on the Wide-Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) technology, a key enabler for resilience of the grid against both small-signal and large-signal disturbances. The WAMS technology using Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) has been regarded as the key to guaranteeing stability, reliability, protection, and most importantly, resilience of next-generation power systems [46] . However, with the exponentially increasing number of PMUs deployed in the North American grid, and the resulting explosion in data volume, the design and deployment of a resilient wide-area communication and computing infrastructure is evolving as one of the greatest challenges to the power system and IT communities. For example, according to UCAlug Open Smart Grid (OpenSG), every PMU requires 600 to1500 kbps bandwidth, 20 ms to 200 ms latency, almost 100% reliability, and a 24-hour backup. With several thousands of networked PMUs being scheduled to be installed in the United States by 2018, WAMS will require a significant Gigabit per second bandwidth. The challenge is even more aggravated by the gradual transition of the computational architecture of widearea monitoring and control from centralized to distributed for facilitating the speed of data processing. The existing local-area network (LAN) or Internet based communication, as well as the centralized computing infrastructures will no longer be sustainable under such a data-burst, especially with strict real-time requirements. Fig. 12 . Divergence of frequency estimation in WAMS with the use of a distributed estimation algorithm (such as ADMM [49] , [50] ) [48] .
One of the biggest roadblocks is that the current power grid IT infrastructure is rigid and has low capacity as it is mostly based on a closed-mission specific architecture. The current push to adopt the existing TCP/IP based open Internet and high-performance computing technologies such as the NASPI-net [47] would not be enough to meet the requirement of collecting and processing very large volumes of realtime data produced by such thousands of PMUs. Secondly, the impact of the unreliable and insecure communication and computation infrastructure, especially the long delay and packet loss uncertainty over the wide-area networks, on the development of new WAMS applications is not well under-stood. For example, as shown in Figure 12 , uncontrolled delays in a network can easily destabilize distributed estimation algorithms for wide-area oscillation monitoring. Finally, and most importantly, very few studies have been conducted to leverage the emerging IT technologies, such as cloud computing, software defined networking (SDN), and network function virtualization (NFV), to accelerate the development of WAMS. In the following subsections we will discuss how co-design strategies between communication and power systems can be exploited to ensure resilience. We show explicitly how multitudes of geographically dispersed PMUs and PDCs can communicate with each other co-operatively for the successful execution of critical transmission system operations, how the various binding and interactive factors in the distributed system can pose bottlenecks, and, finally, how these bottlenecks can be mitigated to guarantee the grid stability and performance. Although discussed primarily for wide-area control, these co-design methods will support any other distributed decision-making process such as wide-area protection, and will also foster newer applications such as distributed power dispatching.
A. Co-designs of Delay-aware Controllers and Wide-area Measurement Networks
There are extensive studies on the impact of networkinduced delay and packet loss on the stability of dynamic physical system or plants connected to a controller via communication networks [51] . The general approach is to derive an upper bound on the network delays, typically modeled as Markov Chains, and design delay-tolerant robust controllers using H ∞ , H 2 , linear matrix inequalities (LMI), and other convex optimization methods using semi-definite programming tools [53] , [54] . Conventional centralized wide-area controllers have been proposed in [55] - [59] , with some recent works on delays [60] - [64] . However, majority of these designs are much more conservative than necessary since they are designed for the worst-case delays. The need for having accurate delay models and network synchronization rules as well as control designs that explicitly accommodate the delays is absolutely critical for wide-area control of power systems since the time-scale of the physical control loop is in the order of tens of seconds to a few minutes, while the spatial scale can range over thousands of miles, for example the entire west coast of the US. That, in fact, is the main motivation for our focus on co-designs, where we can ensure resilience through the design of closed-loop dynamic responses of phase angles, frequencies, voltages, and current phasors at any part of a grid to real network delays, that arise from transport, routing, and most importantly, from scheduling as other applications are running in the network. Figure 13 shows a schematic diagram for a distributed implementation of a network control system for wide-area control of power grids. As we can see, there are three fundamental control loops that interact over different timescales:
• Control loop # 1: Distributed state-estimation and control: This the control-loop that collects PMU data from different buses in the power system, transmits them to the wide-area communication network (such as DETER testbed or GENI), assigns them to various spatially distributed virtual machines (VMs), runs a distributed state estimation and control algorithm between the VMs, and finally transmits the control signal back to the actuators in the power system such as power system stabilizers (PSS) and FACTS devices.
• Control loop # 2: SDN-based real-time communication control: Given the co-existence of the underlying legacy networks (PLC, IP, Ethernet), and more advanced networks, the application-level overlay SDN network will be created and operated to serve different widearea applications by actively controlling the stringent real-time and reliability constraints. Furthermore, coallocation of NFV middle boxes and data processing VMs in the distributed cloud environment will be implemented so that the substation functions can scale out to include virtual middle boxes outside the physical stations. That way the control algorithm running in Loop 1 can be made more efficient as data security and privacy guarantees can be dynamically added along with data movement and aggregation.
• Control loop # 3: Cloud based data collection and processing control loop: Based on the spatial distribution of the PMUs, their data rate and processing requirements on the CPU and memory, distributed virtual PDC clusters will be created and reconfigured in the Cloud, in order to further improve the latency and fault tolerance guarantees of Loop 2.
The details of each of these three loops are described next.
1) Loop 1: Physical Layer Control:
We consider the power grid to be divided into M coherent areas belonging to M different utility companies [59] , where area i has N i states and P i controllers. Sorting the states in terms of the areas, we may write its dynamic model as
where for area i:
Ni×1 is the vector of states,
Pi×1 is the vector of control inputs, and d(t) is the scalar disturbance input. The PMU measurements of voltage, phase angle, frequency and currents at different buses in these areas are accordingly denoted as y(t) = Cx(t). Obviously, if any distributed feedback controller is to be implemented using input-output measurements, PMU data from one area will need to be communicated to actuators in other areas as indicated by the non-zero entries of K. Each of these feedback streams will include an end-to-end delay encountered during transmission through the networked testbed. We will classify these delays into three typesnamely, (1) small delays τ s if the feedback measurements are communicated from PMUs located very close to a given controller, (2) medium delays τ m if the measurements are communicated from PMUs from more distant buses but still within the operating region of the same utility company, and finally (3) large delays τ l if the measurements are communicated over a SDN from remote buses that belong to a different company. But the important point to understand here is that if the communication is executed over a shared network then a significant part of τ s , τ m and τ l will include delays from scheduling and routing. We first state the details of our proposed distributed-MPC (DMPC) control algorithm:
Step 1: Local State Estimation -The first step of DMPC is to run a local phasor state estimator in discrete-time with gain L i at the control center of every i th area, exchanging outputs with its neighboring areas N i as:
Step 2: Prediction of State/Output Estimates -Real-time optimal control requires estimates of the states and outputs over the entire prediction horizon from time t + 1 until time t + N p , and can only make these predictions based on information up to and including the current time t. Equation (5) will be used to obtainx i (k + 1), and optimal estimates can be obtained by forwarding the time index from k to k +j where j = 1, · · · , N p .
Step 3: State Trajectory Communication -The calculated state trajectories will then be sent to the control agents of the neighboring areas via inter-area communication, while those of the same area, but from the previous iteration, are broadcast to the controllers via intra-area communication.
Step 4: Solve Global Optimization Problem -At each iteration, an objective function will be minimized to solve for the optimal input trajectory. This objective function can be any arbitrary nonlinear function of all the states and the inputs, representing a system-level stability or performance metric, and can be of the form:
Step 5: Input Trajectory Communication -Calculated optimal input trajectories will be communicated and exchanged with neighboring areas.
Step 6: Check Convergence and Repeat -Whether or not to proceed to the next iteration is determined by the convergence of the objective function to its minimum value, achieved via appropriate numerical algorithms such as interior-point methods.
Steps 3 and 5 involve inter-area communication, and therefore will be subjected to the three types of delays τ s , τ m and τ l . We next propose the final step of the design by which the steps 1-5 can be adapted to be aware of these delays, instead of being simply tolerant.
Step 7: Delay-Aware Control Design The next question is -how can the controller in Steps 1-5 be co-designed with the information about τ s , τ m and τ l . The conventional approach is to hold the controller update until all the messages arrive at the end of the cycle. However, this approach usually results in poor closed-loop performance. Our alternative approach, therefore, is to (1) design the time-slots τ 1 , τ 2 , etc. for protocols 1, 2 and 3, and (2) then update the control input as new information arrives instead of waiting till the end of the cycle. If tweaking the protocols is difficult, then an alternative strategy will be to estimate the upper bounds for the delays using real-time calculus [66] . The approach is referred to as arbitration, which is an emerging topic of interest in network control systems [67] , [68] , and has been recently applied to power systems [69] . Based on the execution of the three protocols, one can define two modes for the delays -namely, nominal and overrun. If the messages meet their intended deadlines, we will denote them as nominal. If they do not arrive by that deadline, we will refer to them as overruns. Defining two parameters τ th1 and τ th2 such that τ th1 ≤ τ th2 , we will define nominal, skip, and abort cases as:
• If the message has a delay less than τ th1 , we consider the message as the nominal message of the system and no overrun strategy will be activated.
• If the message suffers a delay greater than τ th1 and less than τ th2 , the message will be computed; however, the computations of the following message will be skipped.
• If the message suffers a delay greater than τ th2 , the computations of the message will be aborted, and the message is dropped. This strategy is motivated by assuming that the messages will be significantly delayed, and are no longer useful.
Accordingly, a feasible way to formulate our execution rules can be: (1) if τ th1 ≤ τ th2 ≤ τ wcet , where τ wcet is the worst case delay of the system, both abort and skip can happen, (2) Abort Only: if τ th1 = τ th2 < τ wcet , the message will be dropped if they miss their first deadline, and (3) Skip Only: if τ th1 ≤ τ wcet and τ th2 ≥ τ wcet . One idea will be to set τ th2 = τ wcet to develop a constructive strategy to determine τ th1 .
For example, consider the 50-bus Australian power system model, described in [69] . An LQR excitation controller for this model is designed assuming that the feedback from the PMUs is instantaneous, i.e., there is no network delay. The closed-loop phase angle response of Generator 1 , as shown by the blue curve in Fig. 14 , is observed to be satisfactorily damped. However, when one implements this LQR controller in presence of network delays, the closed-loop system loses stability as shown by the red curve in the figure. The delayaware controller, on the other hand, re-stabilizes the system as testified by the magenta curve. For this particular system the controller, in fact, almost recovers the nominal closedloop response. The corresponding control inputs for these three designs are shown in Fig. 15 . 2) Loop 2: Software Defined Networking (SDN): Typically, the Internet cannot provide the required latency and packet loss performance under high PMU data-rate. Moreover, the network performance is highly random, and therefore, difficult to model accurately. With the recent revolution in networking technology, SDN opens up significantly more degrees of freedom in programability and virtualization, especially for the type of controller proposed in Loop 1 [65] . Accordingly, one may next want to design a lightweight framework of next-generation Gigabit communication systems for PMU data transfer and management, compatible with the requirements of Loop 1. More specifically, one may use SDN to virtualize and actively control those networks Fig. 15 . The control inputs that constitute the communication system between PMUs and cloud service providers. Such virtualization will permit us to prioritize incidents, and make fast response to the delay requirements imposed by Steps 3, 5 and 7 of Loop 1 in a timely and effective way with minimal communication delay.
In our recent paper [48] we showed how probabilistic network-traffic models in the Internet can be integrated with estimation loops for power system monitoring [70] . The basic idea behind Loop 2 is similar. It will enhance priority-type resource provisioning for the prioritized selection of multiple applications running in the network in parallel to widearea control. Depending on network traffic, many of these applications may even be non-power related. The end-to-end network provisioning for wide-area control services can then be formulated as the following optimization problem: constrained to the end-to-end QoS constraints of multiple services (e.g., latency requirements), where m is the total number of network switches managed by SDN controllers and R is the number of types of network services including power grid services. In (7), p (r) j is the portion of network resources allocated to service r in switch j associated with a cost c (r) j for ensuring the end-to-end QoS guarantee of all power grid services. Due to the dynamic nature of networks, the end-to-end QoS constraints may be characterized through stochastic models. The main goal of Loop 2 is to solve the optimization problem (7) continuously with changing network traffic, and thereby minimize the delays in inter-VM communication in Steps 3 and 5 of Loop 1. The solution to this provisioning problem will, in fact, lay a foundation for network flow placement. Since SDN provides a logically centralized global view of network resources, the solution for flow replacement will be suitable to be implemented in an SDN controller.
Another advantage of SDN is that it offers far better resilience guarantees nodes or link fail inside the cloud. In those situations, the network traffic is automatically rerouted via another part of the network decided by the routing protocol, which may create traffic jams, and subsequently may lead to cascading congestion and a greater packet latency over a large part of the network. The traditional approach is to re-run the network flow optimization to rebalance the traffic flow distribution. However, for a SDN the priority will be to quickly identify the control signals that would be affected most due to the failures, and make decisions to either isolate the affected cells or decrease the selective network traffic. A potential research problem is, therefore, to develop reliable mathematical models and optimization algorithms by which these decisions can be made. These models will consider realistic constraints on the latency and throughput, and integrate them with SDN switch implementations.
3) Loop 3: Event-driven Decision Making in the Network: This is slowest control loop among the three, whose purpose is to track the network traffic condition and the performance of the two outer loops, and thereby take intermittent, and on-the-fly decisions about 1) Which PMU data-streams should be assigned to which virtual machine (VM) inside the network testbed depending on the workload of the VM's at any time while Loop 1 is running, in case a VM suddenly becomes overloaded from other applications, 2) Which PMU data-streams should be assigned to which VM's depending on the physical structure of the power system in question, and the resulting correlation between its state variables, and finally 3) Which VM (or, equivalently PDC) should talk to which other VM's or PDC's, i.e., the communication topology between the PDC's to execute Steps 3 and 5 of Loop 1. The idea would be to start from a nominal PMU-PDC assignment structure and a nominal PDC-PDC communication topology, and make intermittent changes to these configurations in case the performance of Loop 1 and 2 falls for any reason at any point of time while they are running. One may accomplish this requirement by constructing and reconfiguring a SDN overlay network. In addition to this virtual SDN requirement, there are other network functions that are needed to address the real time performance, monitoring, and security concerns. For example, load balancing among tens or hundreds of PMU data-feeds to a PDC, wide-area throughput acceleration of UDP or TCP flows, intrusion detection or security preachment monitoring, may become important for executing Loops 1 and 2. Extra network functions are needed to handle the IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850 protocols. More specifically to this application, emerging network function virtualization (NFV) technology provides a good cloud software based solution [71] , in which a network function chain can be dynamically provisioned and managed in the form of VMs or containers. One may explore a "SDN+NFV" approach that uses SDN to actively steer traffic along the NFV chains in the cloud, so as to ensure a resilient power grid infrastructure.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses infrastructure-CPS, that denote the analysis and design of smart infrastructures that monitor themselves, communicate, and most importantly self-govern.
